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In recent years there have been calls for a paradigm shift in psychiatry from treating established illnesses towards early and preventive intervention (McGorry & Killackey, 2002) . These calls have been associated with the development and proliferation of services providing early and preventive intervention for psychosis (Lester et al. 2009 ). However, it is often not appreciated that this is not a new approach : it was proposed at least 100 years ago (Maudsley, 1909) . In his paper published in 1909 Maudsley outlined the need for psychiatric services to focus on treating people early in their illnesses because this is when he thought there was the best chance of recovery and cure, stating : ' the right treatment is to stop the beginnings of mischief ' and ' early treatment … will prevent the necessity … of placing some patients in a lunatic asylum ' (Maudsley, 1909) . In the last 100 years considerable evidence has accrued indicating that he was right -early and preventive intervention is associated with better outcomes and reduced admission rates (for review see McGorry, 2005) . However, there appears to be a gap in translation : many health services have implemented cheaper hybrid and hub-and-spoke models rather than the comprehensive stand-alone early intervention team structures evaluated in the evidence base (Lester et al. 2009 ). The study by Valmaggia et al. (2009) is striking in providing evidence that better outcomes can also be cost effective. We hope that health-care commissioners take note that this was achieved with a comprehensive stand-alone team (Valmaggia et al. 2009 ). Other team structures may not be as effective -a cheaper service may cost more in the long run. Hopefully it will not take another 100 years for the funding to follow the evidence.
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Rather than work towards a therapeutic relationship of mutual trust and respect Sharpe et al. state that their data lends ' support to the idea that interventions which change these variables [i.e. state benefits or opposition to physician imposed psychological explanations of physical symptoms] may improve the outcome for this patient group '. Have Sharpe and colleagues considered how patients may interpret the fiscal side of this intervention ?
In denying a correlation between SF-12 scored disability and receipt of benefit, Sharpe et al. inadvertently infer that patients with ' symptoms unexplained by disease ' are guilty of benefit fraud. The DWP does not use SF-12 to allocate benefits such as disability living allowance (DLA) or incapacity benefit. It is therefore erroneous to use data as the authors do to state that : ' Illness beliefs and financial benefits are more useful in predicting poor outcome than the number of symptoms, disability and distress. ' They also fail to assess the monetary value of any benefit with regard to severity of disability or map this against socio-economic status.
That there is a link has been noted by Rosato & Reilly (2006) who in contrast to Sharpe et al. correlate level of benefit with degree of disability. Indeed some studies of families with disabled children have shown that disability benefits actually improve social inclusion and in the long term allow independence within the family unit (Preston, 2005) .
Of particular note from Preston's study is the improvement in mental health amongst DLA claimants with money spent on cinema trips, social activities as well as contributing to basic costs such as transport.
Sharpe et al. conceivably present a situation in which the most vulnerable within a population are further excluded from society. For the fact remains that in all patient groups socio-economic status is a greater predictor of ill health than the receipt of
